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Economic Reform in Slovenia 
Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, twenty new indepen- 
dent states have emerged where there were previously two. In each of these 
new states, there is an urgent agenda, including the creation of state institutions 
(fiscal authority, tax authority, central bank, border control, etc.), macroeco- 
nomic stabilization, and economic transformation from a socialist economy to 
a market economy. These momentous changes are generally being carried out 
under conditions of  extreme  political  uncertainty, typically  with  legislative 
bodies that are only partially elected, or that were elected under the old regime; 
and with constitutions that are holdovers from the Communist period. 
Of  all the new countries, the one that has gone the furthest in economic 
reform is Slovenia. Slovene independence from Yugoslavia was achieved in 
steps during the period December 1990-October  1991 (see table 6.1). By the 
end of this process, on 8 October 199  1, Slovenia introduced its own currency, 
the Slovene tolar, thereby becoming the first of the new states to achieve mone- 
tary  independence.‘ As  we  shall  stress,  monetary  independence has  been 
highly effective in sparing Slovenia from the resurgence of hyperinflation in 
the rest of the former Yugoslavia in 1992. 
Even with relative successes in the areas of  macroeconomic stabilization 
and trade liberalization, Slovenia has proceeded far too slowly in the area of 
privatization. The delay in implementing privatization was not accidental but 
rather the result of intense political infighting of a sort that is being played out 
Boris Pleskovic was chief economic adviser to Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle during 
1991 and the first part of 1992, until the change of government in May 1992. Jeffrey D. Sachs led 
a team of independent advisers, including David Lipton and Jaime Jaramillo-Vallejo, that provided 
macroeconomic advice to Prime Minister Peterle and that assisted in the drafting and implementa- 
tion of the government’s economic reform program. 
1. The first state of the former Soviet Union to achieve monetary independence, Estonia, bene- 
fited by a careful examination of Slovenia’s experience (Hanson and Sachs 1992). 
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Table 6.1  Timetable to Independence 
26 December 1990  Referendum on independence passes with 90% approval. Slovene 
government appeals for loose confederation of Yugoslav republics, to be 
negotiated during the next 6 months 
Declaration of full independence and sovereignty, 6 months after 
referendum. Outbreak of war on 27 June 1991 
Brioni Accord, sponsored by the EC, calling for 3-month delay in 
implementation of full sovereignty, to pursue further negotiations 
Full independence and monetary reform, 3 months after Brioni Accord 
Recognition by the EC 
25June 1991 
7 July 1991 
8 October 1991 
15 January 1992 
throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On the one side are 
the non-Communist parties of the center and right that argue for a widespread 
distribution  of  shares to the general public; on the other side are lobbying 
groups of state managers and the new left-of-center parties that have succeeded 
the previously ruling Communist party who together are fighting for a transfer 
of ownership to the managers themselves. Similar political infighting has de- 
layed several structural adjustment measures in Slovenia, including a much 
needed banking reform. 
In this paper, we seek to explore Slovenia’s progress in the triple tasks of 
state building, stabilization, and transition to a market economy. We begin with 
the political history of Slovene independence and then turn to the sequence of 
economic policy measures that accompanied the process of political indepen- 
dence, with special emphasis on monetary reform, macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion, and the debate over privatization. We also examine the early evidence 
on Slovenia’s trade prospects, related both to the breakdown of  trade within 
Yugoslavia and to the shift of trade toward Western Europe. We conclude by 
outlining the priorities for the future, which include privatization and financial 
restructuring of commercial banks and enterprises. 
6.1  Overview of Slovenia 
Before 1991, Slovenia was most recently an independent country in the sev- 
enth century, when it was known as Carinthia. It was subsequently incorpo- 
rated into the Frankish empire and later into the Hapsburg empire. In  1918, 
Slovenia joined Croatia and Serbia to establish Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia 
became a Communist state under Marshall Tito’s leadership following World 
War 11,  Slovenia became one of the six republics of the new socialist state. It 
became independent in 199  1. 
Yugoslavia, it is well known, chose a distinctive path of  socialist develop- 
ment after Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948. Industry was socialized, as in the 
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planning after  1965. Market forces were given more scope, and enterprises 
were left with significantly more autonomy than in the Stalinist states. Owner- 
ship was deemed to be “social” rather than “state,” on the ostensible grounds 
that enterprises were managed by  workers’ councils rather than through cen- 
tralized branch ministries. Yugoslavia also maintained a trade pattern that was 
distinctive  among the  socialist economies, in that the  direction of  trade re- 
mained heavily toward Western Europe rather than toward the other socialist 
states. Yugoslavia was never a member of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) trading arrangements. 
We will have occasion to discuss the ownership patterns in Slovenia later in 
the paper, but at this point it is worthwhile to clarify the distinctive features of 
the Yugoslav socialist model. While a vast economics literature emerged to 
describe Yugoslavia’s “market socialism” and “workers’ management system,” 
the economic realities in the Yugoslav socialist economy were quite different 
from the idealizations in the academic literature. More important than the own- 
ership and control structure itself was the fact that Yugoslav industrial enter- 
prises were far more market oriented than their counterparts in Eastern Europe. 
These enterprises traded with Western customers, had considerable flexibility 
as to choice of inputs and outputs, and had some flexibility related to prices. 
In general, there was not a chronic shortage economy in the industrial sector 
or in the consumer markets, so that inputs were available on a fairly reliable 
basis. As a result of these factors, many Slovene companies were able to com- 
pete  in  name-brand  markets,  where  quality  and  reputation  are paramount, 
something unheard of among East European enterprises.* A good illustration 
is the Slovene ski manufacturer Elan, which successfully entered the Western 
ski market. 
6.1,l  Economic Structure 
Slovenia is the richest East European country. Its income per capita was over 
U.S.$6,100  in  1990, compared to an overall Yugoslav average of U.S.$3,060 
and an average in the non-Slovene part of Yugoslavia of U.S.$2,800.  While its 
income per capita is comparable to Greece and Portugal, and despite its rela- 
tive openness, the industrial and employment structure of the Slovene economy 
has important similarities to other East European countries. As in other social- 
ist economies, open unemployment was practically nonexistent in Slovenia un- 
til recently (Abraham and Vodopivec 1991).3 Also, the Slovene economy, like 
others of Eastern Europe, is heavily concentrated in industry, compared with 
OECD countries, which have much larger service sectors (see table 6.2). In 
terms of employment and output, Slovenia is different from the rest of Yugo- 
slavia, possessing a very small agricultural and a large industrial sector. 
2. Some argue that the geographic location of Slovenia made its economy and its people even 
3. There was, however, open unemployment in other parts of Yugoslavia, and the overall unem- 
more exposed than those of  the other Yugoslav republics to market forces. 
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Table 6.2  Structure of GDP, 1988 
Agriculture  Industry  Services 
Value added: 
S1 ovenia  4.5  51.5  44.0 
OECD  2.8  33.0  64.1 
Slovenia (1989)  9.9  50.9  39.2 
OECD  9.4  30.0  60.6 
Employment: 
Source: For the OECD, The Economist Book of  Vital World Statistics (New York:  Random House, 
1990). 36. For Slovenia, Development Issues of the Statistical System: Gross Domestic Product of 
Slovenia in 1987-1988,  no. 3 (Ljubljana: Statistical Office of the Republic of  Slovenia, Decem- 
ber 1991). 
Other similarities between Slovenia and other East European countries in- 
clude a very small privately owned sector, full employment with substantial 
excess demand for labor, and a relatively well-educated labor force. Slovenia 
also resembled other East European countries in the existence of a soft budget 
constraint for its enterprises, low labor mobility, and political intervention in 
enterprises in terms of investment and employment. 
The Slovene economy is relatively open. Representing just 8 percent of the 
total Yugoslav population in 1990, Slovenia accounted for 20 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the former Yugoslavia and 29 percent of total 
Yugoslav exports. In recent years, the volume of external trade (excluding the 
former Yugoslavia) amounted to U.S.$lO billion, equivalent to about 95 per- 
cent of the Slovene GDP, with exports exceeding imports by about 5 percent 
of GDP. In 1991, about 80 percent of merchandise trade was conducted with 
developed countries, 14 percent with East European countries, and about 6 
percent with the developing countries. Major trading partners have been Ger- 
many (25 percent) and Italy (16 percent).  As mentioned  above, the former 
Yugoslavia was not a member country of the CMEA. Most of its trade with the 
former Soviet bloc was conducted in convertible currencies. In recent years, 
about 25 percent of the total sales by Slovene enterprises were exported to the 
markets of the former Yugoslavia. In 1992, trade with the rest of Yugoslavia 
has declined sharply, as we shall note below, and has shifted away from Serbia 
and toward Croatia because of the UN blockade of Serbia. 
6.1.2  Political Developments 
The first free elections in Slovenia were held in April 1990. The center-right 
coalition of six parties, called DEMOS, won the elections with a 52.9 percent 
majority. The opposition was represented by four parties on the left, combining 
political forces emerging from the now-divided Communist party. Legislative 
power is shared by  three chambers in the Parliament. Every law has to be 
agreed on by each of the three chambers. The first two chambers were elected 195  Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia 
directly by  the entire electorate. The third chamber, represented mainly by 
managers of  social enterprises, was elected by  the employees of  enterprises 
only. Although a new constitution was adopted in December 1991, abolishing 
the third chamber, Slovenia will maintain its old institutions until the next elec- 
tions, scheduled for the end of 1992.4 
Despite a weak majority, DEMOS was able to avoid political instability at 
the beginning of its rule. Since most parties held the common goal of obtaining 
independence for Slovenia, there was more or less a nonpartisan spirit in the 
Parliament during the war and struggle for independence. 
Following the recognition of Slovenia and the achievement of the main goal 
that had unified the parties, intense political infighting began. Political parties 
and interest groups had by  then become better organized, and the economic 
reforms became increasingly politicized. The democratic parties argued for 
quick and transparent privatization of social enterprises and banks, including 
denationalization. On the other side, the opposition defended a gradualist re- 
form process in order to prolong the life of  the old system, under which it 
continues to hold major positions. 
When it became clear that the two sides could not reach an agreement, the 
opposition started to block major legislation, including privatization, through 
the third chamber, where it had a majority. This resulted in a paralysis of the 
Parliament, which lasted for months. In April 1992, the government lost a mo- 
tion of nonconfidence, and a new coalition of center and left parties formed a 
new government. 
The experience of Slovenia seems to confirm recent cross-country research, 
which has shown that multiparty governments are especially prone to parlia- 
mentary paralysis (Sachs 1992). Some expected that the more developed and 
open Slovenia would pursue market reforms, including privatization, vigor- 
ously and serve as an example for the rest of Eastern Europe. These expecta- 
tions were met to some extent since substantial progress was made in several 
areas of  economic reform. An  enormous task was  accomplished, especially 
with respect to state building, monetary reform, and macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion. On the other hand, Slovenia’s relative prosperity may  have reduced the 
sense of urgency regarding the major structural changes, including privatiza- 
tion and financial restructuring. 
6.2  Economic Conditions before Independence 
6.2.1  Yugoslav Hyperinflation 
The Yugoslav economy was characterized by  stagnation and unstable and 
rising inflation during the 1980s. Average output growth was 0.6 percent in the 
period 1981-89,  as compared to 6.4 percent during 1974-80  (Estrin and Takla 
4.  After we wrote the paper, elections took place in December 1992 196  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
1991). Open unemployment averaged 14 percent during the period 1981-89. 
Inflation started to accelerate in 1983, reaching about 70 percent in 1985, 90 
percent in 1986, and 2,800 percent in 1989. The economy reached hyperinfla- 
tionary rates of 50-60  percent per month at the end of  1989. At that time, 
Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia and, as part of the dinar area, was subject 
to the same hyperinflation. 
The hyperinflation was caused by chronic fiscal imbalances that resulted in a 
heavy debt structure, both of enterprises and foreign debt. The most interesting 
aspect of the Yugoslav hyperinflation, however, was that a significant compo- 
nent of the money in the economy was indexed money. This was a reflection 
of  an  acute  case  of  currency  substitution  in  the  form  of  deutsche mark- 
denominated deposits within the banking system. Guest workers in Germany 
were  encouraged to  repatriate  savings through  the availability of  deutsche 
mark-denominated accounts. These accounts were so popular, in view of the 
high and unpredictable inflation rate, that more than 80 percent of household 
monetary savings were in foreign-currency-denominated deposits by Novem- 
ber 1989 (Banka Slovenije 1991). In addition, there was significant formal and 
informal indexation of wages and salaries. 
This meant that there was little room for credit expansion without fueling 
inflation, as the ability to collect an inflation tax was almost nil. In addition, 
under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the key interest 
of which was maintaining Yugoslavia current on its external debt servicing, the 
Yugoslav authorities in 1988 and 1989 pursued an undervalued real exchange 
rate policy, in which the nominal exchange rate was steadily devalued in order 
to try to meet an undervalued real exchange rate target. Since each ratchet of 
the exchange rate was almost immediately matched by a rise in domestic prices 
and wages as well as in the dinar value of  the domestic money supply, the 
devaluations were able to achieve the real exchange rate target only at the cost 
of rapidly accelerating inflati~n.~ 
An underlying cause of rising inflation throughout the 1980s was the inabil- 
ity of the federal authorities to exert any monetary control and to enforce fi- 
nancial discipline on enterprises. Enterprise losses increased from a measured 
3 percent to 15 percent of GDP in the second half of the 1980s, although these 
data do not take sufficient care in distinguishing nominal from real interest 
costs of enterprises in measuring their true losses. These losses were accom- 
modated by the banking  system, within a system of soft budget constraints. 
And, despite its relative flexibility, the Yugoslav economy still suffered from 
political intervention at the enterprise level, with significant restrictions on free 
trade and partial control of prices. In 1987, only around 40 percent of prices 
were freely determined, and 48 percent of imports were subject to licenses. 
5.  This outcome of a real exchange rate rule for exchange rate policy has been observed exten- 
sively in Latin American countries, most notably in Brazil, the pioneer of the so-called crawling 
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With a background of  stagnation, poor financial discipline of enterprises, 
banks, and governments at all levels, and a drift toward hyperinflation, a sys- 
tematic reform process began in the late 198Os, with a comprehensive stabiliza- 
tion package being introduced at the start of  1990. The government gradually 
liberalized most prices and imports between 1988 and 1989. As a result of this 
policy, the federal price office was abolished, and 87 percent of imports were 
liberalized by the end of 1989. At the same time, the government started enter- 
prise and banking reforms. 
6.2.2  The Markovic Program 
In January 1990, the federal government under the leadership of Prime Min- 
ister Ante Markovic implemented an anti-inflation stabilization program. The 
program included current account convertibility of the dinar, an initial 20 per- 
cent step devaluation of the dinar at the start of the program, and tight fiscal 
and monetary policy. The policy of a crawling peg was abandoned, and a fixed 
exchange rate of seven dinars per deutsche mark was established to provide a 
nominal anchor to the system; it was held at that level throughout  1990. The 
government also froze nominal wages for six months at the start of the stabili- 
zation program. The program quickly brought down inflation to nearly 0 per- 
cent in April 1990. 
Incomes and demand policies started to relax again in the summer of 1990 
since the federal government was unable to implement the complementary 
structural reforms required of the program (including the bankruptcy of major 
loss-making enterprises) and thereby to maintain overall financial and wage 
discipline. The monthly rate of  inflation increased to 2 percent in July and 8 
percent in October, before falling to 3 percent in November and December 
1990. Money in circulation rose by  138 percent in the ten months to the end 
of October, compared with an increase of retail prices of 110 percent, revealing 
a relaxed monetary policy (Estrin and Takla 1991). The breakdown of financial 
control and incomes policy was caused in part by the start of the centrifugal 
political process in the republics, which eventually led to the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. 
In the middle of 1990, a series of free elections started in the different repub- 
lics, for the first time in forty-five years. Intent on garnering public support, 
political leaders in the republics began to chafe at the monetary and incomes 
restrictions of the Markovic Plan and began to seek ways to circumvent them. 
About the same time, Prime Minister Markovic began to run for office in a 
federal election foreseen at the end of the year. He formed a party and raised 
the wages of public-sector workers substantially as part of the election cam- 
paign. These events undermined  the stabilization program and raised infla- 
tionary expectation in the public. Retail prices in Yugoslavia increased by 122 
percent from December 1989 to December 1990. 
The current account of the balance of payments deteriorated over the year. 
In the summer of  1990, exports fell sharply. To improve exports, the federal 198  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
government devalued the currency, from  seven to nine dinars per deutsche 
mark, on 28 December 1990. However, the prospect of stabilizing the economy 
further deteriorated after the central  bank  branch  located  in  Serbia issued 
U.S.$1.3 billion of currency, in late December 1990 and early January 1991, 
that had not been authorized by the main office of the central bank. 
At  the beginning of  1991, the Yugoslav economy had a budget deficit of 
U.S.$2.6 billion, a 10.9 percent decline in industrial output, resulting in a 20 
percent decline in GDP (for 1991 overall), and an unemployment rate of  18 
percent (Chamber of Commerce 1991). The increasingly independent repub- 
lics refused to pay taxes to the federal government, owing to political differ- 
ences concerning the restructuring of the federation, and the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia relaxed monetary policy. A new inflationary cycle began; monthly 
price  increases  accelerated  to  double-digit  levels  in  mid-1  99 1, effectively 
marking the end of the economic reform program launched in 1990. 
Although the stabilization program was successful in its first phase, it began 
to fail when monetary policy and financial policies were allowed to return to 
their previous laxness in the second half of  1990. What Yugoslavia’s experi- 
ence shows is that an effective stabilization program requires a determined and 
strong government to enforce a strict monetary and fiscal policy and financial 
discipline on enterprises and local government. 
6.3  Slovene Independence 
Under pressure from the Slovene public, as a result  of  growing political 
differences with the rest of Yugoslavia on the future direction of  the federal 
state as well as the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, the Slovene Parlia- 
ment voted to hold a referendum on independence on 26 December 1990 (see 
table 6.1 above). The referendum produced a 90 percent majority in favor of 
independence. After the referendum, Slovenia proposed a six-month period of 
negotiations with the other Yugoslav republics to form a loose confederation 
in the country. Six months later, and after no progress in the negotiations, on 
25 June 1991 the Parliament of Slovenia declared full sovereignty. On 27 June, 
the Yugoslav armed forces attacked the country. Ten days later, the European 
Community (EC) helped bring about a cease-fire. An  agreement, called the 
Brioni Accord, was reached in which Slovenia agreed to a three-month delay in 
implementation of full sovereignty in order to give time for further negotiations 
between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia. 
Three months after the Brioni Accord, and with no progress in the negotia- 
tions, the Parliament reactivated the implementation  of  independence laws. 
The drive toward independence was also spurred by the psychological effect 
of the attempted bombing of the Yugoslav prime minister by the Yugoslav air 
force during a visit by Markovic to Croatia and a rumor that the central bank 
in Belgrade intended to flood Slovenia with dinars. These events led to the 199  Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia 
early introduction of the national currency. The parliament called for the intro- 
duction of the Slovene tolar on 7 October 1991, and the government and mone- 
tary authorities undertook monetary reform the next day. On 15 January 1992, 
Slovenia was recognized by the European Community. Recognition by several 
other countries followed immediately and by the United Nations six months 
later. 
6.3.1  Economic Steps toward Independence 
In the spring of  1991, the government of  Slovenia designed a macroeco- 
nomic program for the economic independence and restructuring of Slovenia 
(Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia 1991). The program, which was sub- 
sequently  passed  by  the Parliament,  had  five  elements:  (i) monetary  inde- 
pendence,  (ii)  macroeconomic  stabilization,  (iii)  financial  restructuring  of 
loss-making enterprises, (iv) restructuring of commercial banks, and (v) priva- 
tization. There was also a wide range of legislation undertaken to establish the 
basic economic institutions of a sovereign state. 
The macroeconomic program was designed as a comprehensive package of 
interrelated market reforms to be launched simultaneously with independence 
(Lipton and Sachs 1991). While the preparation started in all areas of the pack- 
age at the same time, not all steps of the program were implemented in the 
order originally intended because of  several unexpected turns of  events. The 
declaration of independence did not lead to immediate sovereignty. War broke 
out, disrupting the work of the government and forcing the government to de- 
sign and implement an emergency  economic program  instead of  preparing 
long-term economic reforms. At the same time, under the Brioni Accord, the 
government agreed to three months of  further negotiations, which again up- 
staged consideration  of  long-term reforms.  When  Slovene sovereignty was 
achieved, state-building activities, particularly issues of  national defense, re- 
ceived most of the attention. 
Among economic reforms, only the most urgent ones, monetary reform and 
macroeconomic stabilization, received wide political support. Under the cir- 
cumstances, privatization and financial restructuring of enterprises and banks 
were not perceived as immediate priorities by the Parliament and the major 
political actors. Of the three closely related structural reform issues, privatiza- 
tion was considered as the most important. When privatization became a politi- 
cal issue, the other two reforms were put on a waiting list. Preparatory work 
continued on all three reforms, and the expectation was that, when privatiza- 
tion passed the Parliament, the others would follow immediately. As in the rest 
of  Eastern Europe, however, privatization has proved harder than expected. 
Unfortunately, the delay of privatization slowed down the needed restructuring 
of banks and enterprises. In spite of this delay, enormous progress was achieved 
in most other areas of the economic program, especially monetary and fiscal 
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6.3.2  Monetary Reform 
In March 1991, the political leadership decided to make all the necessary 
preparations  for the introduction  of  a new  currency.h The new national cur- 
rency, which was to be stable and convertible from the outset, was meant to 
isolate Slovenia from the inflationary chaos in the rest of Yugoslavia. The basic 
idea was straightforward. All bank accounts, domestic wages, prices, and other 
contractual relations were to be converted automatically from dinars to the new 
currency, the tolar. Currency in circulation was to be physically converted dur- 
ing a short period of time. The new currency was to be the sole legal tender 
after conversion and was to trade freely with international currencies on a con- 
vertible basis and also float freely vis-i-vis the Yugoslav dinar (Pleskovic and 
Sachs 1992). 
To this end, actions were carried out on three fronts. First, steps were taken 
to create a central bank that was capable of carrying out credible and disci- 
plined monetary and exchange rate policies. These steps included the drafting 
of a central bank law that assured its independence, the development of a pol- 
icy design and control unit in the new central bank,  and, perhaps more im- 
portant, fiscal reforms to minimize the pressures for monetization of budget 
deficits. These steps resulted in the central bank law and the macroeconomic 
program adopted by the Council of Ministries in September 1991. 
Second, to make the new currency convertible, legislation was adopted that 
established a unified market for foreign exchange, without the previous sharp 
socialist distinctions between households and firms. With a unified foreign ex- 
change market, the central bank could intervene to carry out its exchange rate 
policy using a market-based approach.’ 
Third, the logistics of the conversion process required sufficient preparation 
to ensure a swift implementation  that would minimize economic disruption 
and any chances of aggressive action by the federal government or by other 
republics. In the event, the conversion process was carried out in three days 
without halting the entire economy. However, the central bank board continued 
6.  Provisional notes were printed by the end of  1990 for emergency purposes, but there was no 
specific economic program for the monetary reform at the time. These notes were intended to be 
used in case the central bank in Belgrade stopped supplying Slovenia with dinar notes. 
7. During the spring and summer of  1991, the National Bank of Yugoslavia maintained a sub- 
stantially overvalued exchange rate that was harming the export-oriented republics of the north. 
As part of a strategy to minimize the effect in Slovenia of Belgrade’s return to currency inconvert- 
ibility and overvaluation of the dinar in  1991, two foreign exchange markets were allowed in the 
Slovene territory prior to the introduction of a national currency. The first of these markets was a 
scheme (known as the EDP) that essentially allowed enterprises to operate at the free market rate 
of  the dinar rather than the overvalued official rate. The second of these markets was meant to 
bring the black market into the financial system, allowing all individuals to trade foreign exchange 
within the system. The main trader in this market was the Ministry of Finance, which used the 
opportunity to build up some reserves for the government at the expense of running a fiscal surplus. 
The development of this market, just after the war, was instrumental in minimizing the effect of 
the uncertain political environment on tourism and border trade. 201  Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia 
to convert dinars into tolars in special cases for several weeks after the initial 
deadline. 
Several issues arose throughout the implementation of the process just de- 
scribed. Other monetary options were considered and discussed widely prior 
to the introduction of the new currency. These included the use of a currency 
board (in which the tolar to deutsche mark conversion rate would be irrevoca- 
bly fixed and the currency would be fully backed by foreign exchange reserves) 
and the introduction of a parallel currency to circulate alongside the Yugoslav 
dinar, in which case both currencies would remain legal tender, at least for a 
while. The currency board was ruled out because Slovenia did not have foreign 
exchange reserves and external financial support could not be secured to allow 
the arrangement to succeed. The parallel currency alternative was dismissed 
from the beginning because it would only aggravate the existing currency sub- 
stitution without isolating Slovenia from the ravages of  Yugoslav hyperinfla- 
tion (Pleskovic and Sachs 1993). The political leadership, under Prime Minis- 
ter Lojze Peterle, stood firmly behind the concept of having a single national 
currency, designed to be stable and convertible from the start. 
In addition, and as has already been mentioned, the introduction and man- 
agement of the new currency was a fairly detailed process, and not all steps 
turned out as originally conceived (Jaramillo-Vallejo and Pleskovic 1991). The 
implementation started on 7 October 1991, when the Slovene monetary unit, 
the tolar, was declared by the Parliament as the sole legal tender in Slovenia, 
thus allowing the monetary reform to take place. The commercial banks, the 
Social Accounting Service, and the post offices were closed for most transac- 
tions during the three days starting 8 October 1991. The conversion of  dinar 
banknotes into tolar banknotes was mostly accomplished in the first day and a 
half since Slovenia has a population of only 2 million and the amount of dinar 
cash in circulation was limited after several years of hyperinflation. 
As planned, all bank accounts and all contracts were converted at a one-to- 
one ratio with the existing dinars. Dinar cash notes were converted into tolar 
notes, up to a limit of 20,000 dinars per person without restrictions. Dinars 
collected by the Bank of Slovenia (the central bank, hereafter BOS) during the 
conversion were deposited  and frozen at the central bank, waiting for later 
negotiations with the rest of Yugoslavia. 
The major motivation for the monetary reform was to protect the Slovene 
economy from hyperinflation, a fate expected for the Yugoslav dinar. As it 
turned out, these expectations were correct. Yugoslav inflation has grown very 
rapidly since October 1991, reaching 102 percent per month in July 1992. In 
contrast, in Slovenia, monthly inflation peaked at 21.5 percent in the month of 
conversion (resulting mainly from the depreciation of the tolar in the conver- 
sion process). Since then, the monthly inflation rate gradually fell to 5.1 per- 
cent in April 1992, to 2.0 percent in July 1992, and to 1.4 percent in August 
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trols, although there was a temporary wages policy through February  1992. 
The monthly inflation rates of Slovenia and Yugoslavia are shown in table 6.3. 
The differences in inflation also show up when comparing the free market 
exchange rate of the Slovene tolar and the black market rate of the Yugoslav 
dinar. As of  8 October 1991, the exchange rates were the same, as the tolar 
was substituted for the dinar on a one-to-one basis. Thereafter, the dinar has 
continued to depreciate rapidly  vis-8-vis international currencies as well as 
against the tolar. By April 1992, the tolar purchased eight dinars (at the black 
market rate of the dinar). Exchange rate developments are shown in table 6.4. 
As described below, the tolar foreign exchange market was actually segmented, 
with the result that there were three relevant rates (by June 1992, the rates had 
largely converged). The free market rate is shown in table 6.4. 
Slovenia started its monetary conversion without any foreign exchange re- 
serves at the central bank. Foreign exchange reserves in commercial banks 
equaled $204 million at the end of September 1991. The improvement in the 
trade balance, due to the rapid recovery of  exports and the compression of 
imports, together with a large amount of  inflow of private capital, resulted in 
the banking system’s having U.S.$l.O billion in net foreign assets by August 
1992. Private capital inflows were spurred by  the new housing privatization 
program and by the introduction of capital account convertibility in the house- 
hold market. At the same time, the BOS built up foreign exchange reserves 
from zero in  October 1991 to about U.S.$660 million in August  1992. The 
positive trade balance reflected tight demand management, supported by  an 
initial real devaluation of the tolar at the time of the monetary conversion, as 
well as the convertibility of the currency, which ended the antiexport bias of 
the overvalued dinar. 
6.3.3  The Tolar Foreign Exchange Market 
Immediately after the introduction of the new currency, the BOS organized 
the foreign exchange system in two separate markets. The government and 
enterprises were allowed to participate on the main market, while households 
had to carry out all their transactions on the parallel market. There were multi- 
ple exchange rates established for the main market: the official rate, the inter- 
enterprise rate, and the interbank rate. There were additional restrictions im- 
posed on enterprises, as described below. 
The initial foreign exchange policy was severely criticized by many observ- 
ers, ourselves included. First, the critics pointed out that interbank meetings 
could not represent an appropriate vehicle for foreign exchange determination 
because of the monopolistic structure of commercial banking in Slovenia. Sec- 
ond, they emphasized that, in order to create an effective foreign exchange 
market, it is necessary to include all the players, including enterprises, banks, 
and households, and to remove restrictions on enterprises (Jaramillo-Vallejo 
1991). 
Reacting to political pressure, the BOS gradually relaxed some of the re- 203  Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia 
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strictions and changed its foreign exchange policy. It decided to implement a 
second-best policy, creating three foreign exchange markets that operate simul- 
taneously: the interenterprise market, the official market, and the household 
market. The official market deals with the need for servicing foreign debt and 
making payments of essential imports through the budget and receiving pay- 
ments of custom duties and taxes. The official exchange rate is used only in 204  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
the official market. The interenterprise market deals with the need for current 
account transactions, while the household market serves individuals. 
Exporters were initially required to surrender 30 percent of export proceeds 
for official purchases at the official exchange rate because of the BOS concern 
with the reserve buildup. In December 1991, when BOS felt more comfortable 
with its level of reserves, this requirement was repealed. In the interenterprise 
market, enterprises were allowed to sell and purchase foreign exchange among 
themselves or with commercial bank  intermediation,  at market-determined 
rates. Until mid-April  1992, enterprises were given only forty-eight hours to 
sell their foreign exchange earnings. After forty-eight hours, the individual en- 
terprise had to sell its foreign exchange to the BOS at the official rate. To 
reduce the negative effect of this policy, the BOS started issuing foreign ex- 
change-denominated CDs to exporters in January 1992. These CDs carry mar- 
ket interest rates and can be traded on the stock exchange. 
The household market operates through a network of officially licensed for- 
eign exchange offices. Until March  1992, the official exchange rate was be- 
tween 10 and 49 percent lower than those in the other two markets. Since then, 
the differences among the rates have rapidly declined, and, by June 1992, all 
three rates had practically converged. In June 1993, the official exchange rate 
was 51.08, compared to the free market (interbank) rate of  51.17 (Bank of 
Slovenia 1992). 
6.3.4  Fiscal Policy Reform 
In order to achieve full economic independence from Yugoslavia through 
an independent and stable currency, Slovenia needed fiscal independence. In 
addition, the stabilization program required tight fiscal policies to control bud- 
get deficits. Slovenia has been quite successful in both modernizing the tax 
system and controlling budget deficits. However, much remains to be done, 
especially in reorienting public spending to better serve the needs of the re- 
structured economy. 
In the past two years, the government has undertaken significant reforms in 
taxation and fiscal consolidation. Under the self-management system, Slovenia 
had a very decentralized public sector. Public-sector agencies had independent 
authority to administer expenditures and set taxes. Most public services, such 
as health care and education, were financed through earmarking at various 
community levels. The republican government budget was responsible only for 
government administration and subsidies to the economy, accounting for less 
than 20 percent of total public-sector expenditures. 
Tax reform started in  1990 and was implemented on  1 January 1991. The 
reform replaced old taxes and contributions with standard taxes on personal 
income and corporate profit and a simplified sales tax. Taxation on enterprise 
income was significantly reduced, while sales taxes were increased in 1992 to 
compensate for the loss of revenue. The reform also consolidated all the previ- 
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the central government budget. So far the reform has been successful and is 
being continued, with preparatory work for introducing a value-added tax. 
Under the Yugoslav system, Slovenia was not allowed to borrow in order to 
finance budget deficits. Thus, the government would adjust expenditures to 
match the revenues. For this reason, there was no need to make a drastic fiscal 
adjustment in 199  1 since the republican budget had been traditionally balanced 
(Jaramillo-Vallejo 1991). This also means  that the stabilization program in 
Slovenia did not require "shock" therapy, from the point of view of reducing a 
large fiscal deficit. 
The overall public sector formally registered a surplus in  1991 amounting 
to 2.1 percent of  GDP.  In  1991, total expenditure of  the public  sector was 
reduced to 41 percent, compared to 49 percent of GDP in 1990. The reduction 
was possible because of lower transfers to the federal government. However, 
owing to arrears incurred by public utilities, the health care system, and local 
governments, the actual fiscal stance might have been more lax than reported. 
An important accomplishment of the monetary reform in Slovenia was that 
the links between fiscal policy and money creation were severed by the govern- 
ment. Although the government might have accrued arrears in the budget, it 
has not financed its expenditures with loans from the BOS. This is an important 
change, compared with the previous policy of the federal government. Never- 
theless, the Slovene government will need to continue to make efforts to bal- 
ance the actual budget expenditures and improve financial discipline in the 
future. 
In the 1992 budget, real increases are planned for administration, defense, 
agricultural  subsidies, and investment programs in the infrastructure  sector. 
Total public expenditures are projected to increase to 46 percent of GDP. A 
deficit of about 1.2 percent of GNP is projected. The deficit is expected to be 
financed mainly by borrowing from the domestic capital market. 
The main weakness of the 1992 budget is that it puts too much emphasis on 
state security, for example, defense and police, while neglecting the need to 
restructure the economy. No financial resources are provided in the budget for 
bank and enterprise restructuring. The budget ignores increasing losses and 
indebtedness of  enterprises and banks and the need for a comprehensive re- 
form in these two sectors. A serious reform effort and future privatization will 
most likely result in increased unemployment, thus requiring additional re- 
sources for a social safety net. The 1992 and future budgets will need to take 
these issues into account in order to speed up the transition toward a market 
economy. 
6.3.5  Institutional Reform 
Compared to the East European countries, and similar to the new states that 
emerged out of  the Soviet Union, Slovenia has faced enormous institutional 
challenges in the past two years (Lipton and Sachs  1992; Pleskovic  1993). 
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administrative basis of a sovereign state. It is an enormous institutional, legal, 
and administrative task to draft the laws. The new state must also quickly make 
a central bank, Ministry of Finance, and other institutions, largely taking ex- 
isting institutions and turning them into self-sustaining actors. As a part of this 
process, the Slovene government drafted seventy-six laws, most of which are 
economic laws representing the legal cornerstone of independence.8 The list of 
laws is shown in appendix table 6A.  1. 
A great deal of the macroeconomic events of the first year consisted of estab- 
lishing the  legal,  administrative, and political  base  for state independence. 
Thus, Slovenia was faced with the task not only of reorienting its institutions 
to fit the needs of  a market economy  but also of  building  completely new 
institutions, sometimes from scratch, ranging from border controls and cus- 
toms to the central bank. 
In terms of economic institutions, the first priority of Slovenia was to estab- 
lish its independent central bank and the necessary banking legislation. The 
task of creating a new central bank was facilitated to some extent because, in 
the former Yugoslavia, each republic had its own branch of the National Bank 
of  Yugoslavia (NBY). The republican  national banks,  as they  were called, 
together with the NBY, implemented monetary policy. While the Bank of Slov- 
enia (formerly the National Bank of Slovenia) still needs upgrading and techni- 
cal assistance to function as an independent modern central bank, substantial 
progress has been made in a short period of time. 
To facilitate the privatization process, Slovenia established in March  1990 
the Privatization  Agency and the Development Fund. Both institutions were 
created as state-owned enterprises. The Privatization  Agency’s function is to 
monitor the privatization  process, while the responsibilities of  the Develop- 
ment Fund are limited to management and disposal of shares obtained from 
privatization. The role of the two agencies has been so far limited to the sale 
of a few enterprises to foreign owners, the evaluation of  enterprises, and the 
preparation of legislation. As of the summer of 1992, no institutional arrange- 
ment has been made for restructuring chronic loss-making enterprises. How- 
ever, there is growing pressure to deal with financial restructuring of poorly 
performing enterprises because of increasing losses. 
Slovenia established the Bank Restructuring Agency in September 1991. An 
Enterprise Restructuring Agency is under consideration. The primary role of 
these two agencies will be to deal simultaneously with increasing debt, compe- 
tition issues, and the poor financial performance of the banking sector and loss- 
making enterprises. 
The government  recognized  the need to consolidate  the existing twenty- 
three ministries into fourteen and has submitted the relevant legislation to the 
8. There were other laws, e.g., for defense, police, and administration, that were important for 
achieving independence. Those are not included among the seventy-six laws, which focused pri- 
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Parliament. The proposed legislation will, for example, abolish the Ministries 
of Planning and Industry. On the other hand, the role of the Ministry of Finance 
will be strengthened as part of the reorganization, which includes the establish- 
ment of a Treasury. 
Slovenia has recognized that one of the most pressing needs is to design a 
legal framework for market activities. To that end, in the spring of  1991, the 
government conceived and  started to draft  sixty-one laws. The majority  of 
these laws are related to economic reform. The list of the laws was submitted 
to the Parliament as part of the macroeconomic program in the fall of  1991 
(see app. table 6A.1). The laws range from new auditing and accounting legis- 
lation to an antimonopoly law. The laws are at various stages of preparation, as 
seen in the table. Some of them (e.g., housing privatization, denationalization, 
pension, and health insurance  laws) have already passed  in  the Parliament, 
while others (e.g., company, enterprise privatization,  and bankruptcy  laws) 
were submitted to the Parliament but have not yet been acted on. 
6.4  Reform Agenda and Structural Adjustment 
6.4.1  Current Economic Situation 
Slovenia has been successful in carrying out the goals of political indepen- 
dence while at the same time achieving stabilization and carrying out funda- 
mental economic reforms. Given difficult circumstances, including a civil war 
and a major loss of  Yugoslav markets, Slovenia has performed relatively well 
during  the  last  two  years  of  transition  from  a  socialist  to  a  free market 
economy. 
As in other East European countries, economic stabilization in Slovenia has 
been associated with a sharp initial decrease in output. Real GDP decreased 
by 2.7 percent in 1989, 3.4 percent in 1990, and 9.3 percent in 1991. Unem- 
ployment increased from 2.9 percent in 1989, to 4.7 percent in 1990, and 8.1 
percent  in  1991. On the demand side, the decline in  output was caused by 
the reduction in exports to former CMEA countries, and especially to former 
Yugoslav markets, as well as by a drop in domestic consumption. While the 
decline in output was deep, it was less severe than in most other countries in 
Eastern Europe. Part of the reason for this is that Slovenia was more open and 
market oriented before the reform started and has therefore been able to shift 
production to Western markets more readily. 
In the spring of 1992, there was an indication of economic recovery, particu- 
larly in the construction, transport, and tourism sectors. The decline in indus- 
trial output continues in  1992, but at a slower rate than in the last quarter of 
199  1. The unemployment rate has increased  only marginally  since the end 
of  1991, but it remains at 11 percent, the highest level in history (table 6.5). 
Merchandise exports increased in the first half of  1992 to U.S.$1,960 million 
from  U.S.$1,890  million  in  the  first  half  of  1991.  Imports  declined  by 208  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 6.5  Current Economic Indicators for Slovenia 
Industry, Monthly 
(deseasonalized)  and Services'  Rate (%) 
Growth Rate  Exports of  Goods  Unemployment 
1992: 
January  -  1.69  275.6  10.5 
February  -1.44  412.5  10.7 
March  -  1.46  503.7  10.7 
April  -1.33  459.6  10.8 
May  -1.50  406.3  10.8 
June  -1.12  510.6  11.0 
Source: Bank of Slovenia (1992). 
"Millions of U.S. dollars. 
U.S.$450  million during the same period. As a result of the decline in output, 
exports as a percentage of GDP increased from 39.5 percent in 1989 to 53.2 
percent in 1991 (Ministry of Planning 1992). 
The economy is expected to experience a recovery over the next few years. 
There are two fundamental problems that need to be addressed in the near 
future in order to speed up the recovery. First, trade will have to continue to be 
reoriented toward new Western and Eastern markets to compensate for the loss 
of former Yugoslav and CMEA markets, and, in many cases, enterprises will 
have to restructure internally in order to reorient to the new markets. As we 
have noted, the shift to Western markets is already occurring. Second, both the 
enterprise and the banking sectors are burdened with structural and financial 
problems, which impede a quick economic recovery. An appropriate solution 
to these problems will require faster progress in passing and implementing 
legislation on privatization and restructuring of enterprises and banks. 
6.4.2  Trade Reorientation 
From the macroeconomic point of view, the notable aspect of independence, 
besides monetary reform, was the internal shock caused by the civil war. The 
war cut Slovenia off physically from the markets in the rest of  the country. 
These markets accounted for about 25 percent of total sales of Slovene enter- 
prises in recent years. The civil war and economic problems in the former 
Yugoslavia nearly destroyed these markets and the financial system. In 1991, 
these problems caused a 38 percent reduction in exports to the other Yugo- 
slav republics. 
Slovenia did not suffer a major CMEA shock since, in the recent past, less 
than 20 percent of total trade was with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. However, owing to the decline in economic activity in Eastern Europe, 
trade with these countries declined by  over 20 percent  and with the former 
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The adjustment of Slovenia’s trade has been quite remarkable, despite the 
war and loss of markets in the former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. This 
was possible because of Slovenia’s Western orientation in trade. In  1989, 68 
percent of Slovenia’s external trade (not counting the Yugoslav market) was 
with developed industrial countries, and 8 percent was with developing coun- 
tries. In 1991, trade with the West increased to 80 percent of the total. Mer- 
chandise exports (machinery and transport equipment and various consumer 
products) to the West increased by U.S.$68 million to U.S.$3,074 million in 
1991. The companies with the fastest supply response have been in transport 
equipment and electrical  machinery, which  are the largest exporters  to the 
Western markets. 
Despite the unfavorable circumstances in  Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union,  total Slovene exports of  goods to non-Yugoslav markets in current 
prices declined by only 6.3 percent in 1991. This decline was on the East Euro- 
pean and Soviet markets. Exports of nonfactor services declined by 38 percent, 
owing to tourism and cross-country transportation, the two sectors most af- 
fected by the civil war. The current account of the balance of payments had a 
surplus of U.S.$225 million in 1991 and U.S.$330 million in the first quarter 
of  1992. Decreased imports and increased exports to the West resulted in a 
trade (goods and nonfactor service) surplus of U.S.$351 million in  1991 and 
U.S.$366 million in the first quarter of 1992. 
In the medium term, Slovenia will have to integrate itself more closely with 
Western Europe. The primary short-term goal of Slovenia should also be to 
continue reorienting its trade from the former Yugoslav and CMEA markets 
to new Western and Eastern markets. To achieve this goal, Slovenia will need 
to continue pursuing the goal of having a convertible and stable currency that 
does not become an obstacle for competitiveness. To this end, Slovenia should 
move to a unified foreign exchange market, where the exchange rate is deter- 
mined mainly by market forces (Jaramillo-Vallejo 199  1). Recent convergence 
in the parallel and official exchange rates for the Slovene tolar opens the way 
for an early merging of the current three foreign exchange markets. 
While it will be difficult to recover trade markets with the former Yugosla- 
via, an effort should be made to simplify transactions with those markets. Un- 
der the current arrangements between  Slovenia and Croatia, exporters from 
one republic are allowed to set up a nonresident account in the other and use 
the balance in that account to pay for their own imports. The bilateral nature 
of this arrangement has made it ineffective, highlighting the need for the estab- 
lishment of a free market for exchange between the tolar and other currencies 
in the former Yugoslavia. 
Slovenia inherited the Yugoslav system of foreign trade. With the recent 
removal of quantitative restrictions in most sectors (except agriculture and tex- 
tiles), the trade regime has become relatively liberal. Tariffs are imposed on 
most imported items, with rates ranging between 0 and 25 percent. In addition, 
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to 6.5 percent. The new customs law intends to abolish the special import duty. 
It  is proposed  that  import duty rates  should be between  5 and 25 percent 
(Chamber of Commerce 1991). 
6.4.3  Privatization Strategy 
A political decision to privatize commercial enterprises was part of the elec- 
tion campaign of the winning DEMOS coalition in  1990. The privatization 
strategy has been focused on the start-up of new private firms and the privatiza- 
tion  of  the  existing  social  sector enterprises.  Although  several laws were 
drafted  and  submitted  to  the  Parliament,  only  limited  success  has  been 
achieved so far. 
Slovenia inherited the “social” ownership pattern of enterprises from Yugo- 
slavia. While, in the past, enterprises in Yugoslavia were “self-managed,’’  the 
system was drastically changed with the  1988 Enterprise Law and the 1989 
Law on Social Capital (Milanovic  1991). These two laws limited the self- 
management rights of workers and allowed firms to be transformed into joint- 
stock companies. The laws permitted  internal and spontaneous privatization 
and have been restricted in Slovenia because of abuses. At present, enterprises 
in Slovenia are neither state owned nor self-managed: property rights are unde- 
termined. Managers, workers, and the state all have some de jure decision- 
making powers. However, in practice, most of these enterprises are controlled 
by  managers,  who have, de facto, almost  absolute  decision-making  power 
over them. 
While existing  small  enterprises are being  privatized  rapidly  in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Gelb and Gray 1991), this type of privatization 
was delayed in Slovenia. Some parliamentary parties were concerned that sepa- 
rate privatization of  small enterprises would delay the privatization of  large 
enterprises. In addition, most retail trade and services are part of large monop- 
olies,  which  are  difficult  to  break  up  without  a  comprehensive  privatiza- 
tion law. 
New private enterprises expanded rapidly during the last two years. How- 
ever, official statistics on this phenomenon are scarce, as the official data still 
focus on the public sector. There were 4,000 registered commercial companies 
in 1989, about 8,000 in 1990, and 12,000 in 1991 (Ministry of Planning 1991). 
Of these, about 2,600 are social enterprises. While employment in the public 
sector declined by  8.2 percent, private-sector employment increased by  4.0 
percent and self-employment by 8.1 percent in 1991. In the same year, 16 per- 
cent  of  the  labor  force,  including  agriculture,  was  registered  in  private 
business. 
The Slovene economy is still dominated by socially owned enterprises. They 
account for over 80 percent of value added and for 84 percent of total employ- 
ment  and  produce  nearly  all  statistically  recorded  nonagricultural  output. 
There are about 2,600 social enterprises to be privatized, representing about 
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capital is in infrastructure, public utilities, and the like, which generally will 
not be privatized in the near future). Of these, about 150 are large enterprises 
with over 500 employees, 750 are medium sized with employment between 
125 and 500, and the rest are small. 
The first debate on privatization in Slovenia focused on the issue of whether 
“socially” owned enterprises should be first renationalized and then privatized 
or whether the intermediate stage should be skipped. The issue was resolved 
in favor of direct privatization. Since the elections, three drafts of the privatiza- 
tion law have been submitted to the Parliament. 
In December  1990, the government submitted to the Parliament the first 
draft privatization law. This law was based on the evaluation of enterprises by 
registered  professionals.  According  to  the  draft  law,  enterprise managers9 
would have been allowed to gain 100 percent control over the enterprise by 
purchasing 10 percent of the shares at a discount, provided that they buy addi- 
tional shares over the next years. The other 90 percent of the shares would 
have been nonvoting “preferred shares” held by the government. The managers 
would have had the right to purchase these shares over time. The preferred 
shares would have paid a dividend yield of only 2 percent.  Essentially, the 
managers would have had ownership rights to the enterprises using the very 
small amount of their own money as a down payment and would have been 
allowed to buy the rest of  the shares by reinvesting enterprise profits over five 
to ten years. The general public would have received only a 2 percent return 
on equity in the interim and no share ownership in the end. 
The draft law was widely discussed, strongly supported by the existing man- 
agers, and severely criticized within the democratic coalition (DEMOS). Sev- 
eral weaknesses were pointed out. First, many believed that accurate evaluation 
is virtually impossible given the absence of capital markets. Second, the pro- 
posed law was considered to be open to speculation and unfair, benefiting a 
small group of existing managers. Third, taking into account the low level of 
domestic financial savings, the proposal was considered especially inappropri- 
ate for large, capital intensive, and expensive enterprises. For these reasons, 
the proposed law lost the support of the ruling coalition. 
The government, under the direction of new economic ministers, designed a 
second draft law on privatization. This draft was based on worker-management 
buyouts for small- and medium-sized firms and mutual funds and other institu- 
tional investors for large enterprises with over 500 employees. For large enter- 
prises, 35 percent of  shares would be distributed to adult citizens for free, 20 
percent to pension funds, and 15 percent to a special “compensation fund,” the 
shares of which would have been distributed to individuals meriting compensa- 
tion as a result of the confiscation of private property in the course of Yugoslav 
9. The draft law  stated that managers and  workers would buy the shares. However, with an 
average salary of approximately U.S.$200.00  per month, workers would hardly be in a position to 
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nationalizations of the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Ten percent of shares would 
be distributed to workers free of charge, and 20 percent would be bought by 
workers and managers at book value. 
In the fall of 1991, the second draft law passed the two democratic chambers 
of the Slovene Parliament, but then it was blocked in the third chamber. The 
third chamber (the chamber of “associate labor”) represents socialist managers 
under the old Communist constitution. The managers filibustered for months, 
despite the clear majority political  support for the broadly based mass priva- 
tization approach, 
To avoid the blockade, the government, together with representatives of the 
major parliamentary parties, designed a third compromise draft privatization 
law. In this draft, the role of  mutual funds was slightly scaled back, and the 
possibility of manager buyouts was enhanced, but under clear, transparent, and 
fair procedures.  According to this proposal,  20 percent of  shares would be 
distributed to workers and managers in their enterprises for free. Forty percent 
of the shares would be reserved for institutional investors. Of these, 20 per- 
cent would be distributed free to all citizens via five to ten mutual funds, 10 
percent to the pension fund, and 10 percent to the compensation fund. The 
workers  and managers  would be  allowed to choose between  receiving free 
shares in their enterprises or in mutual funds. The remaining 40 percent of the 
shares would be sold to workers and managers or outside investors. 
The compromise draft privatization law gained the support of a majority of 
the parliamentary parties. After intense debates in the Parliament, the concept 
of free distribution of shares received substantial support from the general pub- 
lic. A recent survey shows that 55-65  percent of the population support free 
distribution of shares (Tos 1992). The opposition to this concept from the third 
chamber of the Parliament weakened, after several of the managers-deputies 
started their own private enterprises. The compromise privatization  law was 
passed by the Parliament in November 1992. 
6.4.4  Financial Restructuring 
Financial restructuring of commercial banks and enterprises was considered 
a high priority of the macroeconomic program of the government. The main 
goals of the program were to restore competition in both the banking and the 
enterprise sectors, to rehabilitate troubled banks and enterprises, and to change 
the ownership structure. 
Slovenia inherited from the former Yugoslavia a banking sector that suffers 
from serious deficiencies,  which  impede the development of an efficient  fi- 
nancial system. First, the banking system is heavily dominated by one bank, 
Ljubljanska  Banka, which  with  thirteen  associated  regional  banks  controls 
over 90 percent of  the banking business in Slovenia. Second, this bank  and 
others in Slovenia are owned by social enterprises, which in turn are also major 
debtors and have their representatives  sitting on the bank boards. Third, there 
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cent) and an inadequate capital structure. Fourth, there is low confidence in the 
banking system, stemming from limitations on the withdrawals of households' 
foreign currency deposits (DM 1.8 billion) as a result of insufficient foreign 
exchange  reserves  to  back  the deposits.IO Fifth,  many  banks  are currently 
charging very high real interest rates for corporate loans, ranging between 20 
and 30 percent per annum, apparently as the result of the existing monopolistic 
structure of the banking  system and the poor quality of its portfolio. Sixth, 
traditionally, there have been very close ties between the central bank and the 
commercial banking system, causing problems with the effectiveness of mone- 
tary policies and banking supervision. 
These issues have been widely discussed by the government and the Parlia- 
ment. Eight months after the  1990 election, the situation initially worsened, 
when the two largest Slovene commercial banks were merged into a monopoly. 
Substantial progress has been made since then in improving the banking struc- 
ture. Modem laws governing the central bank and commercial banking, pru- 
dential regulations, and the rehabilitation of banks have changed the banking 
system. Banks have been audited for the second time, and the Bank Restructur- 
ing Agency was established in the fall of  1991. 
In the spring of  1992, the government prepared a partial bank restructuring 
program dealing separately with the problem of frozen foreign exchange de- 
posits. The program consisted of a law to issue public bonds to cover DM 1.8 
billion of frozen foreign exchange deposits of households. Because the law did 
not address bank restructuring and privatization, it was rejected by  the Par- 
liament. 
Since then, the agency has prepared a bank restructuring program, which is 
currently under consideration and which draws on the independence program 
of the spring of  1991. Major objectives of the program are to restore the bal- 
ance sheet of  the banks to a healthy position, improve competition, change 
the ownership structure through privatization, and improve the structure and 
regulation of the banking system. An important aspect of the problem, still not 
properly  addressed,  is related  to  the  financial  restructuring  of  heavily  in- 
debted enterprises. 
Although significant progress was made in revising the legal framework for 
enterprise activities, Slovenia has not advanced far with enterprise restructur- 
ing. Some firms have taken the initiative themselves, mainly through joint ven- 
10.  During the  1970s and  1980s, households were allowed to deposit foreign currency into 
foreign-denominated bank accounts (mostly deutsche mark denominated). This was used widely, 
for example, by families of Yugoslav guest workers in Germany as well as by the local domestic 
population. Deposits in each of the republics were credited to households, while the foreign ex- 
change was routinely and mandatorily transferred to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. 
The central bank did not maintain these reserves in order to back the deposits in  the banking 
system. Rather, the reserves were spent in debt servicing or in foreign exchange market interven- 
tion. Thus, the Slovene banks (mainly the Ljubljanska Banka) have foreign-denominated liabilities 
but insufficient foreign exchange assets, and Slovenia as a whole lacks the official reserves to 
provide to the commercial banks in the event of a major withdrawal of deposits. Starting in  1991, 
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tures with foreign partners. Owing to the lack of privatization and bank restruc- 
turing, a vast majority of social enterprises have not made the adjustments that 
are needed to deal with the shift of markets and increased competition. This 
has resulted in the increase of enterprise losses, defaults on debts to the bank- 
ing sector, and a rise in interenterprise arrears. In this pattern, Slovenia matches 
the experience of  almost all other socialist economies in the transition to a 
market economy. 
The financial position of  Slovene enterprises has worsened since 1987. In 
1991, the reported losses reached 31.4 billion tolars, or about 8.7 percent of 
GDP. About  100 large industrial enterprises account for two-thirds of  total 
enterprise losses. The rest of the losses are concentrated in the public utility 
and infrastructure sectors. The lack of financial discipline, excessive employ- 
ment, and past wasteful investments have been the main causes of  the poor 
performance of Slovene enterprises. Past price controls also caused losses in 
some sectors. The losses are currently financed more or less automatically by 
interenterprise credits and arrears, bank loans, and, in a few cases, government 
subsidies, including tax exemptions. 
As in other East European economies, bankruptcy has rarely been resorted 
to in Slovenia, mainly because the existing legislation  is difficult to apply, 
banks are owned by social enterprises, the collateral system is underdeveloped, 
and there is a lack of professional experience with the process. In 1990, about 
119 bankruptcy  cases  were  initiated. In  1991, 571 enterprises  qualified as 
bankrupt under the current legislation, but only 200 cases were initiated, as the 
current bankruptcy law has effectively been suspended with respect to social 
enterprises owing to the unusual  circumstances  of  1991 (the declaration of 
independence, the Yugoslav invasion). A new bankruptcy law is being consid- 
ered by the Parliament, one along the lines of the American “Chapter  1 1 .” 
One of the main factors influencing the adjustment process of enterprises is 
the weakness of the ownership structure in social enterprises and banks. Social 
enterprises in Slovenia are major owners of the banks. They have restricted the 
autonomy of the banks for credit allocation, thus limiting the bank’s capacity 
to exert adequate financial discipline and worsening  their portfolio  of  bad 
debts. In addition, the absence of ownership or clear control rights in the enter- 
prises gave an incentive to managers and workers to decapitalize enterprises 
and increase the enterprises’  debts. As a result, many viable enterprises are 
unable to service their rapidly accumulating debts, and many banks are close 
to insolvency. Therefore, a full recovery of the enterprise sector is conditional 
on faster progress on restructuring and privatization of banks and social enter- 
prises simultaneously. 
These facts were recognized by the government macroeconomic program in 
1991. The program of  financial restructuring of  commercial enterprises and 
banks included, as the key element, generalized debt equity swaps between 
banks and heavily indebted enterprises, which could reduce the cash flow de- 
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losing enterprises should be divided into three categories: (i) manufacturing 
enterprises to be financially restructured; (ii) manufacturing firms to be closed 
down; and (iii) public utilities, infrastructure, and state enterprises to be regu- 
lated. For the first category (i.e., heavily indebted enterprises), it was suggested 
that the debts of  the enterprises needed to be reduced prior to or as part of 
privatization. For the second category, the restructuring was to include a clear 
timetable for closure and explicit subsidies to reduce employment gradually 
when outright closure was not feasible because of social or economic implica- 
tions. For the third category (i.e., state enterprises), it was suggested that the 
government should establish a system for governance, regulation, and restruc- 
turing of these enterprises into commercial public services. 
For  the  banking  sector,  the  program  of  financial  restructuring  included 
breaking up the monopoly, a change in ownership structure and privatization, 
implementing prudential regulation, and establishing new institutions (e.g., de- 
posit insurance, an export bank) and new banking legislation, including anti- 
monopoly, accounting, and auditing legislation. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Of all the new countries, Slovenia has gone furthest in economic reform 
during the last two years. During this time, Slovenia achieved political inde- 
pendence, stabilized its economy, introduced its own currency, and carried out 
fundamental economic reforms. Slovenia has made significant progress in its 
transition from a socialist to a market economy, despite difficult circumstances, 
including civil war and a loss of major markets. 
Slovenia was more developed than other countries of Eastern Europe before 
the transition. Its economy was more open, prices and imports were relatively 
free, and the budget was more or less balanced. Nevertheless, it suffered from 
high inflation and a lack of monetary and fiscal discipline, especially at the 
federal level. By accomplishing successful monetary and fiscal reforms and 
macroeconomic  stabilization  with  sharply  reduced  inflation,  Slovenia  has 
proved that it can manage its macroeconomic affairs better than the former Yu- 
goslavia. 
Slovenia is much richer  and more open to the West than any other East 
European country. It is well ahead in terms of income per capita. But the gap 
is narrowing with respect to structural reforms and progress toward a market 
economy. Some countries of Eastern Europe, like Poland and Czechoslovakia 
have been quite successful in stabilizing and liberalizing their economies in a 
relatively short time. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have made better 
progress in terms of privatization, especially of  small- and medium-sized en- 
terprises, and the rapid growth of the new private sector. 
After  accomplishing  a successful  stabilization and monetary  and institu- 
tional reforms, the weaknesses of  the socialist legacy of “social” ownership 
are becoming more clear in Slovenia. These weaknesses are reflected in  an 
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and banks. To overcome these problems, Slovenia has to turn its attention to 
the medium- and long-term problems of privatization and the restructuring of 
enterprises and banks. These problems deserve priority  if Slovenia wants to 
retain a competitive edge in exports and become more efficient in its domestic 
markets. Restructuring of the economy will require reorientation of resources 
from heavy toward light industry, housing construction, and services. The so- 
cial sector has to be substantially reduced  and made more efficient through 
privatization and restructuring to reduce its heavy burden on the budget. With- 
out privatization,  enterprises will be left without incentives and the tools to 
restructure. While Slovenia needs  to continue the stabilization  policies and 
continue building free market institutions and legislation, privatization and re- 
structuring are the most important issues left on the reform agenda. 
Slovenia has an excellent opportunity to develop a full-fledged market econ- 
omy and become integrated with Europe if it speeds up the reform process. It 
has all the conditions necessary  to reach this goal in a relatively short time. 
The challenge ahead is to reach a consensus and implement the rest of  the 
reforms needed for a well-functioning free market economy. 
Appendix 
Table 6A.1  A List of 76 Laws-the  Legal Cornerstone of Independence 
Ratified laws 
1. Law on the Bank of Slovenia 
2. Law on Banks and Savings Banks 
3. Law  on Pre-Rehabilitation, Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy, and Liquidation of Banks and Sav- 
4.  Law on Foreign Currency Transactions 
5. Law on Credit Transactions with Foreign Countries 
6. Law on Pricing 
7. Law on the Agency Guaranteeing Bank Deposits and Savings 
8. Law on Denationalization 
9. Law on the Agency for Privatization 
ings Banks 
10. Law on the Development Fund 
11. Law on Cooperatives 
12. Law on Registration of Businesses 
13. Law on Bank Restructuring Agency 
14. Law on Customs Service 
15. Law on External Affairs 
Proposed laws” 
16. Law on the Ownership Transformation of Enterprises 
17. Law on Economic Public Services 
18. Law on Mutual Funds and Investment Companies 
19. Law on the Compensation Fund 
20. Law on Capital and Personal Enterprises 
21. Law on Involuntary Settlement and Bankruptcy 217  Political Independence and Economic Reform in Slovenia 
Table 6A.1  (continued) 
22. Law on Co-Management of Employees 
23. Law on the Representation of Labor Unions 
24. Law on the Protection of Competition 
25. Law on Commerce 
26. Law on the Protection of Consumers 
27. Law on the Protection of Industrial Property 
28. Law on Small-Scale Business 
29. Law on Commercial Tax 
30. Law on Customs 
3 1. Law on Customs and Tariffs 
32. Law on Free Trade Zones 
33. Law on Accounting 
34. Law on Financial Auditing 
35. Law on Financial Transactions 
36. Law on the Stock Exchange 
37. Law on Securities 
38. Law on Public Debt 
39. Law on Institutions for the Stimulation of Exports 
40. Law on Foreign Investment 
41. Law on Public Servants 
42. Law on Real Estate and on Real Estate Rights of Foreigners 
43. Law on Railways 
44. Law on Longshore Activities 
45. Law on Airports 
46. Law on Postal and Telecommunication Services 
47. Law on Telecommunications 
48. Law on Postal Services 
49. Law on Roads 
50. Law on Road Transportation 
5 1. Law on Energy 
52. Law on Rational Use of Energy 
53. Law on Goods Reserves 
54. Law on Innovation 
55. Law on Employment of Foreigners 
56. Law on Insurance 
57. Law on Special Taxes for Import of Agricultural Products 
58. Law on the Stimulation of Tourism 
59. Law on Standardization and Technical Regulations 
60. Law on Meteorology 
61. Law on Public Notaries 
Other rat$ed  laws 
62. Law on financing public expenditure 
63. Law on income tax 
64. Law on taxes on the profit of legal entities 
65. Laws on income taxes 
66. Law on amendments to the law on working relations 
67. Law on taxes on citizens 
68. Law on employment and unemployment insurance 
69. Law on amendments of pension and disability insurance 
70. Law on prices 
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7  1. Law on foreign credit transactions 
72. Law on the monetary unit of  the Republic of Slovenia 
73. Laws on the use of  the monetary unit in Slovenia 
74. Law on housing 
75. Law on research activities 
76. Law on the partial reimbursement of damages caused by military aggression on the Republic 
of Slovenia in 1991 
Nore: The first 61 laws were submitted to the Parliament as part of the macroeconomic program 
for the independence of Slovenia. The rest of  the list represents other laws ratified during the last 
two years. 
"Some of the proposed laws may have been ratified. 
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Discussion Summary 
Saul Estrin made three points. First, he noted that, in comparison to the rest of 
Eastern Europe, Slovenia began the reform process with relatively favorable 
initial conditions. He emphasized  Slovenia’s long-standing  experience  with 
markets, high income per  capita, extensive past  success in exporting to the 
West, and limited exposure to the CMEA shock. However, he did note that 
Slovenia was hard hit by the breakdown of trade among the newly independent 
Yugoslav republics.  Second,  Estrin  discussed  the  particular  problems  that 
Slovenia faces because  of  its legacy of  worker-managed  firms. Estrin  sug- 
gested that workers and managers have a strong vested interest in the privatiza- 
tion process since these groups have heretofore controlled the firms in which 
they work. Moreover, because these control rights are vaguely defined, the pri- 
vatization process may generate substantial conflict among the principal actors. 
Third, Estrin noted that the new states in what was once the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia face special challenges created by the transition to statehood. He 
observed that these hurdles would be relatively  less problematic in Slovenia 
because its population is ethnically homogeneous and government legitimacy 
is not substantially questioned. 
Simon Johnson asked the authors to evaluate the development of the private 
sector. Boris Pleskovic responded that the private sector has grown very rapidly 
but that its progress has been impeded because the legislature has not passed 
the Law on Small-Scale Business. 
Jacek Rostowski asked why Slovene inflation continued at a rate of  over 10 
percent per month one quarter after the macroeconomic stabilization program 
was initiated. Jeffrey Sachs observed that the continuing high rate of inflation 
could be blamed on an expansionary monetary policy that violated the planned 
program of tight credit. Rostowski also asked to whom the enterprise managers 
are  responsible  since  the  workers’  councils  have  been  disempowered. 
Pleskovic answered that the managers are often not responsible to anyone. He 
said that the primary way to exert control over them is to cut off their access 
to subsidies. 
Jan Svejnar asked for an elaboration on the political situation in Slovenia. 
Sachs responded that the Slovene political system is very complicated and cur- 
rently prone to deadlock: Slovenia has three parliamentary chambers, ten polit- 
ical parties represented in Parliament, and a president and prime minister from 
different political factions. Sachs noted that the large number of elected politi- 220  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
cal parties is a consequence of Slovenia’s system of proportional representation 
with a minimum threshold. 
Sachs concluded the session with a response to Estrin’s comments.  Sachs 
noted that the system of worker management was largely symbolic; managers 
were effectively in charge even before the current reform process. Sachs said 
that the current political phase is not just a clean discussion about the efficacy 
of different models of privatization but rather a struggle over who is going to 
end up owningkontrolling Slovenia’s assets at the end of the day. 
Sachs also wanted to add to Estrin’s list of the peculiar features of the Slo- 
vene initial conditions. Sachs noted that the Slovene banking system is particu- 
larly problematic  because the banks  are owned by  the same enterprises  to 
which the banks made many of their loans. On top of  this problem, the banks 
have hitherto been largely unregulated. 